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Abstract—In a modern vehicle, there are over seventy Elec-
tronics Control Units (ECUs). For an in-vehicle network, ECUs
communicate with each other by following a standard com-
munication protocol, such as Controller Area Network (CAN).
However, an attacker can easily access the in-vehicle network to
compromise ECUs through a WLAN or Bluetooth. Though there
are various deep learning (DL) methods suggested for securing
in-vehicle networks, recent studies on adversarial examples have
shown that attackers can easily fool DL models. In this research,
we further explore adversarial examples in an in-vehicle network.
We first discover and implement two adversarial attack models
that are harmful to a Long Short Term Memory (LSTM)-based
detection model used in the in-vehicle network. Then, we propose
an Adversarial Attack Defending System (AADS) for securing an
in-vehicle network. Specifically, we focus on brake-related ECUs
in an in-vehicle network. Our experimental results demonstrate
that adversaries can easily attack the LSTM-based detection
model with a success rate of over 98%, and the proposed AADS
achieves over 99% accuracy for detecting adversarial attacks.
Index Terms—In-vehicle network, ECU, adversarial attack
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, a modern vehicle, such as a connected and
autonomous vehicle (CAV), contains a great number of Elec-
tronics Control Units (ECUs) that communicate with each
other based on a standard communication protocol, such as
Controller Area Network (CAN), in a vehicle network. With
the development of CAVs, more and more ECUs are added in
a vehicle for advancing driving functionalities, such as lane
changing, parking assistance, and emergency braking [1]. All
these features may require a vehicle to communicate with
itself, other vehicles, and infrastructures, such as Vehicle-to-
Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communi-
cation [2].
Securing in-vehicle networks is as important as ensuring
the security of Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication.
Researchers have shown that ECUs in an in-vehicle network
are vulnerable to remote attacks [3], [4]. An attacker can
easily access an in-vehicle network to compromise ECUs
through a WLAN or Bluetooth since ECUs are all connected
and vice versa. Thus, in-vehicle networks are vulnerable to a
variety of attacks, such as intrusion attacks and false data
injection attacks (FDIA) [5]. Deep learning methods have
been widely used to detect attacks in in-vehicle networks [6],
[7]. However, recent studies have shown that deep learning
models are usually vulnerable to adversarial examples [8].
Adversaries can manipulate input data and force a trained
model to produce mis-classified outputs. This makes a deep
learning-based detection model useless. Hence, it is crucial
to building a robust deep learning model against adversarial
examples.
Current studies are mostly focused on developing and
defending adversarial attacks in image datasets, such as craft-
ing adversarial examples based on the MNIST dataset and
attacking traffic signs in a CAV system [9]. In this paper, we
explore two adversarial attacks: Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) attack and Basic Iterative Method (BIM) attack on
sequential datasets. To show the limitation of the machine
learning based detection model, we first adopt the method used
in [6] to build an LSTM-based detection model that can detect
false data injection attacks with a success rate of over 98%.
Then, we show that FGSM and BIM attacks can easily bypass
this high performance LSTM-based detection model among
99% of the time. To countermeasure against these adversarial
attacks, we propose an Adversarial Attack Defending System
(AADS) for in-vehicle networks, where AADS can build
a robust LSTM-based detection model that able to detect
both false data injection attack and two adversarial attacks
efficiently.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
1) To demonstrate the limitation of the LSTM-based de-
tection model, we implement two adversarial attacks
for attacking the LSTM-based detection model. Our
experimental results demonstrate that adversaries can
easily attack the LSTM-based detection model with a
success rate of over 98%.
2) To overcome these adversarial attacks, we propose
AADS to detect adversarial attacks efficiently. To be
precise, we countermeasure two adversarial attacks,
FGSM and BIM, by adversarially retrianing our de-
tection model iteratively such that we obtain a robust
detection model to defend aganist both attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
discusses related work about in-vehicle network security and
adversarial attacks. Section III presents adversarial attack
models. In Section IV, we give the design of the proposed
AADS. Then, in Section V, we discuss the evaluation of
AADS, such as detection accuracy, adversarial attack success
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rate, and results of defending the adversarial attacks. Last,
the conclusion of our studies and future work are presented
in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
An in-vehicle network is vulnerable to many different types
of attacks due to several intrinsic vulnerabilities of a CAN bus,
such as broadcast transmission, no authentication, and no en-
cryption. The attackers can access in-vehicle networks through
interfaces like Bluetooth and Wi-Fi to perform attacks, such as
FDIA, replay attack, and Denial of Service (DoS) attack [10].
Recently, machine learning methods have been applied in
intrusion detection for in-vehicle networks. Kang et al. [7]
proposed an intrusion detection system (IDS) using a deep
neural network (DNN) to secure in-vehicle networks. A pre-
trained unsupervised deep belief network was used to initialize
the parameters of their DNN model in order to achieve better
accuracy. Kuwahara et al. [11] focused on the observation of
CAN messages in a fixed time window to detected intrusions.
They adopted both supervised and unsupervised learning to
perform intrusion detection.
Khan et al [6] proposed an in-vehicle false information
attack defending framework using machine learning and
adopted SDN in their framework. Their highest classification
accuracy is 95% with a precision and recall of 0.95 and 0.87,
respectively.
Deep learning methods have been found to be extremely
successful for a variety of fields. However, researchers have
recently discovered that the deep learning models can be
compromised by adversarial attacks [8]. Chakraborty et al. [9]
surveyed different types of adversarial attacks and present
some existing countermeasures against adversarial attacks.
They discussed the efficiency and challenges of those counter-
measures. Most existing studies on adversarial attacks focus
on attacking images [12]–[14].
More recently, there are some studies regarding adversarial
attacks in the CAV domain. They mainly focus on image
aspects as well, such as vehicle detection and object detec-
tion [15]. Cao et al. [16] proposed an adversarial sensor attack
on LiDAR sensors to fool the LiDAR-based perception into
detecting wrong objects and making wrong decisions in an
autonomous vehicle. Their new attacking method increased
the success rate by 2.65 times on average. In this paper,
we focus on attacking an in-vehicle network. We study the
sequential dataset instead of image dataset. We consider two
adversarial attacks, FGSM and BIM, as our threat models.
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to apply
adversarial attacks on in-vehicle networks.
III. ATTACK MODEL
Deep learning methods have been widely applied to a
variety of domains, including image classification, Natural
Language Processing (NLP), speech recognition, CAVs, and
malware detection. Ensuring the security of deep learning
methods used in those domains has become a crucial task,
especially in the area of security-critical environments, such
as CAVs. Szegedy et al. [8] first found that the neural network
models can be compromised by adversarial attacks. That is,
attackers can create adversarial examples to limit the use of
neural networks. Similarly, adversarial examples can be used
by attackers to cause a vehicle to take unexpected actions
and result in disastrous consequences. In this section, we first
briefly present the FDIA model adopted from [6] to attack
ECUs. Then, we introduce two adversarial attack methods to
attack the LSTM-based detection model.
A. False Data Injection Attack (FDIA)
An adversarial attacker has various ways to modify the
original data. One easy way to modify the original data is
to add some uniform random noise to it. We first observe the
normal range for each signal. Then, we generate a random
value that follows the uniform distribution within the interval
of the normal range. The equation of the FDIA model is shown
as follows:
X
′
i = Xi + δi, (1)
where δi ∼ U(−Xi, Xmaxi −Xi) is a uniform random value
added to the normal data to create the adversarial data, Xmaxi
is the maximum value of a signal, i denotes the signal number,
and X
′
i is the adversarial data of ith signal modified by the
attacker. For example, X
′
6 is the adversarial data of the 6th
signal modified by the attacker. Detailed description of the
dataset can be found in [6].
B. Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
In this paper, we assume that an attacker has complete
knowledge of a neural network model. That is, the attacker
can access the architecture of the neural network model and
all parameters from the model. This is considered as a white-
box attack.
First, let’s give out some notations. Let F (X) be the neural
network model that takes the input X ∈ Rn for some integer
n and yields the output y. Given a valid input X , attackers will
try to create a similar input X
′
so that the output of adversarial
input does not match its original one, that is F (X
′
) 6= F (X),
but ||X −X ′ || < η for some specified small number η ∈ R.
Note that the || ∗ || is some application specific metrics for
measuring the similarity between X and X
′
. In this paper,
the distance metric we use is L2 metric, which is a standard
Euclidean distance between X and X
′
.
There are two types of adversarial attacks: targeted and
untargeted adversarial attacks. Targeted adversarial attacks
search for an adversarial input X
′
such that it will be classified
as the specified class t. That is, F (X
′
) = t, t 6= y. On
the contrary, untargeted adversarial attacks only search for
an adversarial input X
′
so that F (X
′
) 6= y.
An attacker can attack the deep learning based detection
model by using the fast gradient sign method [14]. The
deep learning model is obtained through gradient descent
optimization to minimize the cost function J(X, ylabel), i.e.,
reduce the error between the true label ylabel and the predicted
labels ypred. On the contrary, an attacker wants to increase the
error, and a simple but effective way to do it is increasing the
Fig. 1. Attack on TQI ACOR signal. (a) Normal signal that is correctly
classified as ”Normal” by the LSTM-based detection model; (b) FDIA attack
signal that is correctly classified as ”Attack” by the LSTM-based detection
model; (c) FDIA attack signal being misclassified as ”Normal” after applying
FGSM to it even though signal in (c) is similar to signal in (b). (d) FDIA
attack signal being misclassified as ”Normal” after applying BIM to it.
error by gradient ascent of the cost function ∇XJ(X, ylabel).
That is, an attacker can simple add noise in the direction of
gradient ascent of the cost function sign(∇XJ(X, ylabel)).
Hence, X
′
can be calculated using FGSM as follows:
X
′
= X + × sign(∇XJ(X, ylabel)), (2)
where  is included to control the magnitude of the noise. In
order to keep the adversarial examples X ′ as similar as X , we
usually try to choose a value of  that is as small as possible.
C. Basic Iterative Method (BIM)
BIM is an iterative version of FGSM proposed by Ku-
rakin [13]. BIM generates the adversarial examples iteratively
using a smaller step α. First, we set up the initial:
X
′
0 = X, (3)
and then X
′
i+1 is calculated as follows:
X
′
i+1 = ClipX,{X
′
i + α× sign(∇XJ(X, ylabel))}, (4)
where α is the step size and ClipX,{∗} is the element-wise
clipping of X to make the clipped value belong to the range of
[Xi,j−,Xi,j+]. This ensures that the generated adversarial
examples are in the original range of the input X so that it
cannot be easily detected by a simple outlier detector.
To craft adversarial data using FDIA, we observe the normal
range for each signal from the DBC file for KIA Soul and
generate a random value that follows the uniform distribution
within the interval of the normal range. For the sample that
has a period of 10 seconds, we then randomly choose 1
second to attack. Figure 1(b) shows an example of FDIA
attack to the normal signal in Figure 1(a). A LSTM-based
detection model proposed in [6] can easily detect this attack
model with nearly 100% success rate. However, such a type
of deep learning based detection model itself is vulnerable to
adversarial attacks. For instance, we can modify the attack
signal in Figure 1(b) slightly with fast gradient sign method
described in subsection B. As shown in Figure 1(c), there is
still attack at 393-394 seconds and its signal is quite similar
to one shown in Figure 1(b). Intuitively, we can assume
if LSTM-based detection model can correctly identify the
attack signal in (b), it likely ables to detect the attack signal
in (c). However, the LSTM-based detection model unable
to detect it; i.e., it classifies signal in (b) as ”Attack” but
misclassifies signal in (c). as ”Normal.” Similarly, in the case
of BIM, Figure 1(d), the LSTM-based detection model fails
to recognize that signal in (d) is the attack signals.
IV. METHODOLOGY
CAN is a standard bus communication protocol that has
been widely used for in-vehicle network communication. It
uses a broadcasting method to transmit messages from one
ECU to other ECUs on the bus. The source and destination
information are not included in the transmitted messages.
Thus, it is vulnerable to attacks due to a lack of authentication.
An attacker can easily modify the data on the CAN bus, and
this can result in vehicle malfunctions. In this section, we first
describe the dataset and data processing method used in this
study. Then, we introduce our AADS in details.
A. Data Processing
In order to examine the efficacy of proposed AADS, the
dataset from real in-vehicle CAN bus is used in this paper.
It is collected from the KIA SOUL by Hacking and Coun-
termeasure Research Lab [17]. In order to better understand
and process the dataset, the raw CAN data frames need to
be decoded. We use a generic KIA DBC file decoder from
OpenDBC repository to decode the dataset [18]. OpenDBC
is created by CommaAI with a repository of DBC files for
different models of vehicles. The DBC file is usually used to
describe the data over a CAN bus. It has the information to
decode CAN data frames. For instance, we can use the scale
and offset values in the DBC file to convert raw bits of data
into signal values. In the raw dataset, the CAN IDs (CID) are
in hexadecimal format whereas the Message IDs (MID) are
decimal in the DBC file. Therefore, we first need to convert
the CIDs in the raw dataset to match the MIDs in the DBC
file for decoding.
Each CAN ID has a specific ECU associated with it, and
each ECU has multiple signals. Each signal has its own
decoding information like scale and offset. For the comparison
purpose, we explore 20 signals associated with five ECUs
the same as Khan et al. [6]. These ECUs are Motor Driven
Power Steering (MDPS), Engine Management System (EMS),
Anti-lock Braking System (ABS), Electronic Parking Brake
System (EPB), and Electronic Stability Control System (ESC).
MDPS and EMS ECUs send CAN messages/frames to ABS,
EPB, and ESE. EMS broadcasts four types of CAN messages
(MSG), including EMS11, EMS12, EMS14, and EMS16,
whereas MDPS ECU broadcasts SAS11 CAN messages. Each
type of CAN messages contains different signals, such as
TQI ACOR, TQFR, N, TQI, TPS, VB, etc. The detailed
information of message type and signals as well as the detailed
information for decoding the raw CAN data frames can be
found in [6].
Since we only investigate brake related ECUs, we first need
to filter out all unrelated data. After filtering, we have 952,101
rows of CAN data frames. The number of CAN data frames
for each CAN ID is evenly distributed. We use 20 signals
presented in [6].
Then, the dataset is divided based on the timestamps. We
choose each 10 seconds as one sample. For example, the first
sample lasts from the 1st second to the 10th second, and the
second sample lasts from the 2nd second to the 11th second,
and so on. Thus, we creates 1894 samples in total. Among
these samples, half of them are randomly selected to craft
adversarial data.
B. AADS Architecture
In this study, we propose an adversarial attack defending
system to defend against adversarial attacks. We create a
malicious ECU that is connected to the CAN bus. There are
six ECUs connected to the CAN bus. EMS and MDPS ECUs
can only broadcast CAN messages, whereas ABS, ESC, and
EPB ECUs can only receive CAN messages. The malicious
ECU can both broadcast and receive CAN messages.
1) LSTM-based Detection Model: In the AADS, we build
an LSTM-based detection model to detect FDIA by follow-
ing [6]. We use 20 signals as input features, and each input
feature is a sequence of decoded CAN signal values. In our
model, the LSTM layer contains 128 neurons. Then, an output
layer with only one neuron follows the LSTM layer. This is
because we are dealing with a binary classification problem,
whose output is either 1 (Attack) or 0 (Normal). The activation
function we use for this layer is sigmoid. The cost function
we use is binary cross-entropy. The optimization function
we choose is Adam [19], which is an adaptive learning rate
optimization algorithm. It computes individual learning rates
for different parameters.
In our dataset, we have 1894 instances in total. Among
these instances, we use 80% of the dataset for training, 10%
for validation, and 10% for testing. To be precise, we have
1516 samples for training, 189 samples for validation, and 189
samples for testing. The total trainable parameters are 76,417.
2) Adversarial Attacks Defending Scheme: Adversarial at-
tacks can compromise the trained machine learning model
to produce incorrect classification results. In a scenario like
CAVs, it can cause a deadly outcome if the system failed
to perform correctly. In this paper, we explore two adversar-
ial attacks, FGSM and BIM. First, we generate adversarial
examples using both FGSM and BIM on the test dataset to
see the efficiency of compromising the trained LSTM model.
Then, we propose an adversarial retraining method to make
the LSTM model more robust against both the FGSM and
BIM attacks.
In order to build a robust LSTM detection model, we
iteratively re-train the LSTM model using both the adversarial
examples and the original training samples. Let S denote
original samples, S
′
denote samples after adversarial attacks
on S, let N denote the batch size, and let i be the i-th
iteration of re-training. Algorithm 1 shows the method of
our adversarial attack defending scheme. For iteration i, the
detailed steps of iterative re-training are 1) randomly choose
N instances Si from the training dataset; 2) generate N
adversarial examples S
′
i using the adversarial model; 3) add
N adversarial examples S
′
i to adversarial repository S
repo;
4) randomly choose N adversarial samples Sadvi from the
repository Srepo; 5) combine the selected N adversarial
examples Sadvi and the N original instances Si, so we have
2N samples for training. After re-training, we validate on
validation dataset V and check whether the stopping criteria is
met. If it is met, we stop the re-training process. Otherwise, the
process repeats. Each iteration produces a new LSTM model
Mi. When process stops we save the final LSTM modelMf ,
and we evaluate Mf using the test dataset to determine the
robustness of Mf .
Algorithm 1: Adversarial Defending Algorithms
Result: Robust LSTM Model Mf
while Training dataset is not empty do
Randomly choose N instances Si from the training
dataset;
Use adversarial model to generate S
′
i ;
Add S
′
i to adversarial repository S
repo;
Randomly choose N adversarial samples Sadvi ;
Train on Si + Sadvi , Validate on V
end
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we first evaluate the LSTM-based detection
model. Then, we evaluate the effectiveness of FGSM and BIM
attack followed by the evaluation of our adversarial attack
defending scheme.
A. LSTM-based Detection Model Evaluation
The LSTM-based detection model has an input layer, a
LSTM layer with 128 neurons, and an output layer. The
number of epochs is set to 50. The training process is carried
out on GAIVI2, which is a computer cluster with large scale
parallel computing capabilities. GAIVI2 has a TensorFlow
version of 2.0. We test with different optimizers, such as SGD,
Adam, RMSprop, and Adagrad. Table I shows the evaluation
of accuracy, recall, precision, F1 score, and training time
for different optimizers. The accuracy is the accuracy of the
unseen test set, and the Time column reports the time used to
train the model in seconds.
We can see from Table I that with Adam optimizer, we have
achieved the best performance with an accuracy of 99.47%.
The recall, precision, and F1 score for the Adam optimizer are
Fig. 2. Evaluation of accuracy and binary cross-entropy loss
TABLE I
EVALUATION OF DIFFERENT BATCH SIZES
Optimizer Accuracy Recall Precision F1 Score Time(s)
RMSprop 98.42% 0.98 0.98 0.98 83.96
Adam 99.47% 0.99 0.99 0.99 82.66
Adagrad 73.16% 0.73 0.80 0.72 83.32
SGD 64.74% 0.65 0.68 0.63 83.38
all 0.99. RMSprop optimizer has the second-best performance
with an accuracy of 98.42%, and both recall and precision
are 0.98. The time for training the model by using Adam,
RMSprop, Adagrad, and SGD optimizer are 82.66 seconds,
83.96 seconds, 83.32 seconds, and 83.38 seconds, respectively.
We can see that the training time is very short. This makes
AADS possible to update the model every two minutes and
perform the detection in real-time. Compare to Khan et al. [6]
our approach has a better performance. Khan et al. have the
highest accuracy of 95%, precision of 0.95, and recall of
0.87, while our approach has the highest accuracy of 99.47%,
precision of 0.99, and recall of 0.99.
Figure 2 shows the final results of the LSTM-based detec-
tion model. The training process runs for 50 epochs. On the
top of Figure 2, it can be seen that we achieved a training
accuracy of 99.93% and the validation accuracy of 99.98%.
On the bottom of Figure 2, we report the binary cross-entropy
loss, where the losses are 0.0012 and 0.00096 for training and
validation respectively.
B. Adversarial Defending Scheme Evaluation
In this subsection, we demonstrate the limitation of the
LSTM-based detection model by implementing two adver-
sarial attacks for attacking the LSTM-based detection model
obtained in the previous section. Then, we introduce our
defending method.
We generate the adversarial example and use it to show the
limitation of LSTM-based detection model. In order to keep
the adversarial examples as similar as the original input, we
try to choose a  as small as possible. Figure 3(a) shows the
attack success rates on the test dataset using both FGSM and
BIM with different  values. In the BIM attack, we find that
when we set α = 1 and iterate five times, we can achieve the
best results. We can see from Figure 3(a) that when  = 5,
BIM has reached the best success rate of 99.47%. Similarly,
when  = 13, FGSM has achieved the best success rate of
98.42%. In general, the BIM attack is more efficient than
the FGSM attack to compromise our LSTM model. Table II
shows the success rates, accuracies, best , and time used to
craft adversarial examples on the test dataset for both FGSM
and BIM.
TABLE II
EVALUATION AFTER ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
Method Success Rate% Accuracy%  Time (s)
FGSM 98.42% 1.58% 12 9.24
BIM 99.47% 0.53% 5 37.35
In our adversarial attack defending scheme, we apply
iterative re-training to countermeasure adversarial attacks. We
choose batch size N = 200 and iterate 100 times. Figure 3(c)
shows the re-training accuracies against the FGSM attack at
each iteration. The accuracies are evaluated on the validation
set. We can see that when we run approximately 62 iterations,
the training and validation accuracies become stable. This
indicates that the FGSM attack can no longer affect our re-
trained LSTM model. In the early iterations, there are some
large fluctuations, which is because for each iteration we
randomly choose 200 samples from the training dataset and
it takes some iterations to cover all the training dataset to be
selected. Figure 3(d) shows the re-training accuracies against
the BIM attack. When we run around 56 iterations, the training
and validation accuracies become stable. Figure 3(b) compares
the test accuracy of iterative re-training against FGSM and
BIM, respectively. It shows that BIM attack performs better
than FGSM to fool the LSTM model for the first 56 iterations.
However, after more iterations, our LSTM model becomes
more robust. Neither attack can reduce the performance of the
retrained LSTM. Our results demonstrate that our adversarial
attack defending method can successfully defend against both
FGSM and BIM by iterative re-training.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this research, we proposed an adversarial attack de-
fending system for in-vehicle networks. To demonstrate the
need for such a system for any deep learning-based detection
model and to show the limitation of the general deep learning-
based detection model, we follow a recent paper by Khan et
al. [6] to build an LSTM-based detection model. This LSTM-
based detection model can successfully detect an attack signal
Fig. 3. Evaluation of adversarial attack defending scheme
generated by FDIA over 98% time. This may seem to be
a good detection model initially; however, we are able to
attack this LSTM-based detection model using FGSM and
BIM attacks, respectively. The accuracies of the LSTM-based
detection model are only 1.58% and 0.53% under FGSM and
BIM attacks, respectively. This basically makes the LSTM-
based detection model useless. This clearly indicates the
drawback of using a deep learning-based detection model.
Then, we present our proposed defending scheme against
these attacks. The experimental results demonstrated that after
our adversarial attack defending scheme is used, the re-
trained LSTM-based detection model becomes robust and is
no longer affected by both FGSM and BIM attacks. Actually,
we achieved an accuracy of 99.47% for detecting FDIA. In
the future, we will explore more complex adversarial attack
models to craft adversarial CAN messages, as well as to
formalize the security guarantee.
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